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European welfare state regimes and their generosity 
towards the elderly 
Axel Boersch-Supan 
 
1. Introduction 
Europe is known for its well-developed welfare state, particularly if seen from the US Ameri-
can perspective. The GDP share of social expenditures of the EU15 countries in the year 2001 
was 23.9 percent vis-à-vis 14.7 percent in the US (OECD Factbook 2006). Some think that 
the European welfare state is too large because it crowds out economic activities. Indeed, 
GDP per capita in the US is almost 50 percent higher than the average of the EU15 countries, 
see Figure 1. 
Figure 1: GDP per capita (EU25=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2005 
Discomfort with this figure, however, is limited in Europe. Europeans cite their longer leisure 
time, their lower income inequality and their longer life expectancy, see Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Income inequality, leisure time and life expectancy at birth 
Annual workhours Gini Life Expectancy at birth
EU15 1,690 30.05 79.0
US 1,920 35.67 77.2  
Source: OECD Factbook 2006 
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This balance may become upset by the demographic aging process. The European population 
is already much older than the US population, and population aging continues at a faster rate 
than in the US due to the lower European fertility rate (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Population aging in Europe and the US: Percentage age 65 and older 
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Source: UN population projections, 2002 Revision. 
 
Europe now is as old (measured as share of individuals aged 65 and older) as the US is pro-
jected in 2017. Even more dramatic is the aging of Europe past the year 2025: While Europe 
will continue to age, the proportion of elderly in the US will stay relatively stable. 
Aging implies more social security expenditures towards the elderly (pensions, health care, 
long-term care) per capita, and a forteriori per young and/or employed person. Will the ex-
penditures for the elderly blast the welfare state? Will the welfare state disable itself because 
the incentive effects created by ever increasing tax and contribution rates will crowd out eco-
nomic activity, thus eroding the tax base which finances the welfare state? Will spending for 
the elderly crowd out spending for young families and education, undermining fertility and 
productivity? 
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This paper uses aggregate data (official statistics from EUROSTAT and OECD) as well as 
individual data (from SHARE, the new Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) 
in order to show the statistical correlations among various dimensions of welfare state gener-
osity. It has a simple structure: System description – Outcomes – Causes. Section 2 describes 
the European welfare states and their evolution during the European integration process. It 
compares their generosity to the elderly with the generosity towards the young. Section 3 
looks at actual policy outcomes, such as unemployment and poverty rates among the young 
and the elderly, and the inequality in wealth, income and consumption. We also look at non-
economic outcomes such as health and longevity. Section 4 makes a few steps in the direction 
of a causal analysis: Why has the generosity of the European welfare state evolved as it did? 
We offer some demographic and political economy reasons, and collect some evidence on 
incentive effects. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. European Welfare States 
This section describes the European welfare states and their evolution during the European 
integration process. We first look at the general size of the welfare states, then at their gener-
osity towards the elderly, and finally at expenditures targeted to the young. 
2a. General Generosity: Size of the welfare states 
The size of the welfare state – usually measured as the share of GDP devoted to social expen-
ditures – varies a great deal in Europe, although almost all European countries feature the 
distinctively higher share than the US that was mentioned before. The Scandinavian countries, 
notably Sweden, have the highest social expenditure shares, Ireland the lowest. 
Figure 4: Size of the Welfare State (Social Expenditures per GDP, in Percentages) 
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Source: OECD Factbook 2006 
The European Union in general, and particularly the Scandinavian countries, experienced a 
retrenchment of the welfare states in the early 1990s. Quite interesting is the opposite devel-
opment in Ireland and Portugal, the poorest countries of the EU in the 1980s. While Portugal 
increased the GDP share of social expenditures throughout the observation period depicted in 
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Figure 4, Ireland did not increase social expenditures nearly as fast as their GDP, resulting in 
the only social expenditure share that is lower than the US. 
Generosity may more appropriately be defined as per capita social spending, in purchasing 
power parity terms. This is depicted in Figure 5. According to this measure, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Denmark are most generous to their citizens, Ireland and the Mediterranean 
countries are the least generous welfare states. Of those five countries, however, Italy is much 
closer to the EU15 average, while the other four countries feature a remarkable gap in per 
capita social expenditures vis-à-vis the rest of the pre-accession European Union. 
Figure 5: Size of the Welfare State (Social Expenditures per Capita, in Euro PPP) 
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Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 
Figure 5 also reveals that the growth rates of per capita spending are almost identical for all 
EU15 countries. While Italy features a particularly low increase, Ireland a particularly large 
one, these differences are relatively small and there is little sign of convergence. European 
integration has not – at least no so far – led to an equalization of per capita social expendi-
tures. There is, however, some sign of convergence in the GDP share of social expenditures, 
see the preceding Figure 4. Overall, the variety of the European welfare states is large; larger 
than the three or four archetypical welfare state models a la Esping-Andersen (2003) suggest. 
The following subsection will deepen this point. We will split social expenditures in three 
parts: spending that can be reasonably clearly be targeted to the elderly (mainly pensions, see 
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the following subsection 2b); spending that can be reasonably clearly be targeted to the young 
(mainly education and family allowances, subsection 2c); and spending which may go to the 
young and the old as well as the middle aged (e.g. healthcare; this is contained in the figures 
of this subsection but will not be analyzed separately). 
2b. Generosity towards the elderly 
Spending for the elderly – here defined as expenditures for old-age, disability and survivor 
pensions – is actually diverging in Europe, see Figure 6. Sweden and Austria spend most for 
the elderly on a per capita basis, and Ireland spends the least, with a remarkable gap. Portugal, 
Spain and Greece have increased their spending on the elderly, but not so much as to con-
verge with the rest of the EU15. 
Figure 6: Social Expenditures Dedicated to the Elderly (per capita, in Euro PPP) 
Social Expenditures to the Elderly (per capita, PPP)
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Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 
Holding total social spending constant, the picture is remarkably different, see Figure 7. Italy 
and Ireland stand out: Italy spends about 70 percent of the entire social budget on the elderly, 
15 percentage points more than the EU15 average, while Ireland spends less than a third of its 
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social budget on the elderly, 25 percentage points less than the EU15 average. Essentially, 
these expenditure shares have stayed constant over the last 15 years. 
Figure 7: Share of Social Expenditures Dedicated to the Elderly (Percentages of Total) 
SHARE old
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Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 
2c. Generosity towards the young 
Figure 8 corresponds to Figure 7 and shows the share of the social budget devoted to the 
young – defined as family and child support, education and unemployment benefits. It is not 
the flip side of Figure 7 because health care and a variety of smaller social transfers which go 
to both young and old are not included in Figures 7 and 8. 
While Italy and Ireland still stand out as extreme, at least in recent years, they do not stand out 
as extremely as with regards to the share of the social budget devoted to the elderly. Remark-
able is the great variety of spending shares to the younger generations in Europe: it ranges 
from about 5 percent to about 30 percent of the social budget. 
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Figure 8: Share of Social Expenditures Dedicated to the Young (Percentages of Total)  
SHARE young
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Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 
Equally different are the per capita expenditures, see Figure 9. Here, Denmark and the other 
Scandinavian countries stand out. 
Figure 9: Social Expenditures Dedicated to the Young (per capita, in Euro PPP) 
Social Expenditures to the Young (per capita, PPP)
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2d. Old vs. young: relative generosity, crowding out 
The resulting picture emerges quite clearly, see Figure 10. Here the share of the social budget 
devoted to the elderly (Figure 7) is divided by the share of the social budget devoted to the 
young (Figure 8). For the pre-accession European Union, this ratio is about 3 and has not 
changed very much between 1990 and 2003. Relative to this benchmark, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and, by far most pronounced Italy, lean their generosity more 
towards the elderly, while Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, France and Germany 
spend a relatively larger share of their social budgets on the young. 
Figure 10: Relative Generosity to the Elderly vs. the Young (Social Expenditure Shares to 
the Elderly divided by Social Expenditure Shares to the Young) 
RATIO old/young
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Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2006 
The ratio in Figure 10 has not changed very much between 1990 and 2003: national spending 
patterns have stayed rather constant and different from each other throughout this time period, 
in spite of an accelerated European integration process. 
Does this stark cross-sectional variation within Europe teach us something about crowding 
out? Do we have evidence that spending on the elderly crowds out spending on the young? 
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Figure 11 sheds some light on this question. It plots the per capita social expenditures (in 
Euro at purchasing power parity) depicted in Figures 6 and 9 against each other. 
Figure 11: Relative Generosity to the Elderly vs. the Young (Expenditure per capita devoted 
to the elderly versus per capita spending devoted to the young, Euro PPP) 
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This picture reveals no evidence for a negative correlation between the spending share for the 
elderly and the spending share for the young. More formally, a pooled regression through the 
points in Figure 11 yields a positively significant coefficient with an R
2 
of 0.27. The time se-
ries correlation of the EU15 average has about the same slope and an R
2 
of 0.85; and a cross-
sectional regression for the 2003 values features a slightly smaller, but still positively signifi-
cant coefficient with an R
2 
of 0.12. The positive correlation can be interpreted as evidence, 
that the welfare states have expanded without much of a trade-off between spending towards 
the elderly and spending towards the poor. 
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Figure 12 repeats this exercise on the basis of spending shares (measured as percentage of 
GDP). This figure seems to show less of a positive correlation, and, in the case of Italy, may-
be even a negative correlation. 
Figure 12: Relative Generosity to the Elderly vs. the Young (Social expenditures devoted to 
the elderly versus social expenditures devoted to the young; percentage of GDP) 
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More formally, Figure 13 displays a set of time-series regressions by country based on the 
above data. Indeed, Italy exhibits a negative coefficient but it is insignificant. In about half of 
the European countries, the regression produces a significant slope. In all of these cases, the 
slope is a positive one. The aggregate EU15 regression also features a positive slope, although 
not significant at conventional levels. 
We conclude that there is little evidence for a crowding out effect between being generous to 
the elderly and being generous to the young. Social spending for the elderly and the young 
expanded and contracted pretty much in synch with the overall social budget, which increased 
considerably in absolute terms (Figure 5) and consolidated relative to GDP (Figure 4). 
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Figure 13: Time-series regressions of social expenditure share devoted to the elderly on 
social expenditure share devoted to the young (percentage of GDP) 
Country Coef. Std. Err. t-stat P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
EU 0.97 0.60 1.6 13% -0.34 2.29
IT -2.24 2.04 -1.1 29% -6.68 2.19
DK -0.13 0.23 -0.6 57% -0.63 0.36
UK -0.02 0.39 -0.1 95% -0.87 0.82
BE 0.78 0.90 0.9 44% -1.72 3.27
ES 0.27 0.17 1.5 15% -0.11 0.64
FR 0.78 0.44 1.8 10% -0.18 1.74
AT 1.17 0.37 3.1 1% 0.36 1.99
SW 0.30 0.09 3.4 1% 0.10 0.50
DE 0.96 0.24 4.0 0% 0.43 1.48
NL 1.16 0.21 5.6 0% 0.71 1.61
PT 3.60 0.62 5.8 0% 2.26 4.94
GR 1.89 0.32 5.9 0% 1.19 2.58
FI 0.64 0.06 9.9 0% 0.49 0.79
IE 0.96 0.09 10.2 0% 0.76 1.17
 
Source: Author’s regressions based on the data depicted in Figure 12. 
 13 
3. Policy outcomes 
Section 3 looks at actual policy outcomes, such as unemployment and poverty rates among 
the young and the elderly, and the inequality in wealth, income and consumption. We also 
look at non-economic outcomes such as health and longevity. Most of this section is based on 
the SHARE data, the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe, collected in 2004. 
3a. Income levels 
Figure 14 examines the actual relative income level of pensioners. It distinguishes young 
(aged 72 and younger) and old retirees (aged 73 and older) and relates their net public and 
private income to the total net income of working individuals aged between 50 and 64. 
Figure 14: Income level of retirees (age 72 and less/age 73 and more) relative to income of 
working persons aged 50 to 65 
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Source: Wilke (2006), based on SHARE 2004 
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Denmark and the Netherlands have Beveridgian flat base pensions, while the other countries 
have Bismarckian earnings-related pensions. For the younger retirees, this is reflected in the 
much lower relative public income levels in those two countries. In the Netherlands, this is 
fully compensated by private income (largely occupational pensions), but not in Denmark. 
The older Dutch retirees still enjoy a much higher pre-reform public pension. In the other 
countries, old age income is dominated by public pensions.  
The patterns in Figure 14, based on micro data, are somewhat different from what one might 
expect after having Figure 6 which was based on aggregate spending figures. The case of 
Denmark catches the eye. If the main goal of welfare state generosity towards the elderly is to 
prolong accustomed income levels also during retirement, then Denmark, which spends con-
siderably more than the average EU15 country on social expenditures geared towards the eld-
erly, fails. 
Another feature that catches the eye in Figure 14 is the high income for French retirees. Most 
additional private income are occupational pensions financed pay-as-you-go, while the public 
pension level, relative to the middle-aged, is in line with the European average. 
 
3b. Distribution of wealth, income, and consumption 
One explanation lies in a different goal of social expenditures in Denmark, namely poverty 
reduction and income equality. Denmark, together with Sweden, has by far the lowest Gini 
coefficient on income inequality among the population aged 50+. Note that this is in spite of a 
considerable wealth inequality in Denmark, pretty much the same as everywhere in the 
SHARE countries. Consumption inequality, maybe the most appropriate measure for equal 
living conditions, is also very low. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of income, consumption and wealth among the elderly 
(GINI coefficients) 
 
     Source: Bonsang, Perelman, and van den Bosch (2005), based on SHARE 2004 
 
Income inequality is much larger in the Netherlands. Figure 14 masks the large heterogeneity 
in additional private income for Dutch elderly.  
 
3c. Youth and elderly unemployment 
France and Denmark are interesting cases because one of the main indicators for successful 
social policy to the young comes out dramatically different in both countries. While Denmark 
has one of the lowest youth unemployment rates of the OECD countries, France has by far the 
highest youth unemployment rate in Europe, topped in the OECD only by Turkey and the 
Slovak Republic. French social spending levels on the young are above EU15 average (see 
Figures 8 and 9), however, much of this goes to family and child subsidies, less to education 
than in other European countries. In a very broad sense, one might interpret this finding as a 
kind of crowding out: public attention focussed on maintaining the income level of retirees 
has crowded out attention on the unemployment situation of the young . 
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Figure 16: Percentage of youths aged between 15 and 19 who are not in education nor in 
employment, 2003 
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2006 
The flip side of youth unemployment is the unemployment rate among the elderly. In the age 
range of 55 and older, unemployment is often disguised as early retirement, often with a 
disability pension or similar financing mechanisms. Hence, Figure 17 depicts the employment 
rate of individuals aged 55-64. 
Sweden has by far the highest labor force participation rate in this age range, exceeding that 
of the United States and even Japan. Denmark and the UK are also considerably above the 
EU15 average. 
In turn, France, Italy, Belgium and Austria have very low labor force participation rates, more 
than 10 percentage points below the EU15 average and 20 percentage points below the so-
called Lisbon Target of 50 percent participation. 
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Figure 17: Employment rate of individuals aged 55-64, 1992-2004 
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Source: Eurostat Online Data Archive April 2006 
 
3d. Health and longevity 
Arguably one of the most important social policy outcomes is health since it is a main driver 
for well-being. Differences in the health status of a population are very difficult to measure. 
The SHARE data has a wide array of physical and mental health measures, some self-
reported, others physically measured. Two examples of a physical measurement are grip 
strength and walking speed. They show a remarkably consistent North-South gradient through 
Europe. 
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Figure 18: Walking speed and grip strength of individuals aged 50 and older 
 
 
Source: Mackenbach, Avendano, Andersen-Ranberg, and Aro (2005), based on SHARE 2004 
 
Using all available health data in SHARE, including several mental health and cognition tests, 
Jürges (2005) has developed a comprehensive health index depicted in Figure 19. 
Figure 19: Comprehensive health index of individuals aged 50 and older 
 
Source: Jürges (2005), based on SHARE 2004 
 
It paints a more detailed picture and identifies Switzerland and Spain as well-defined ex-
tremes with a health index well above and well below the SHARE countries’ average. Varia-
tion in the population is, of course, very large, as shown by the brackets. 
Worse health does not necessarily translate in lower life expectancy, as Figure 20 shows. 
Denmark, with one of the highest health indexes has the lowest life expectancy among the 
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EU15 countries, and Spain, performing badly on the health index depicted in Figure 19, has 
the highest life expectancy, surpassed only by Japan. This paradox is subject of intensive on-
going research; it is mirrored in the fact that women live longer, but have worse health (for 
example, see Figure 18). 
Figure 20: 
Denmark 77.2
United States 77.2
Portugal 77.3
Ireland 77.8
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Greece 78.1
Germany 78.4
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United Kingdom 78.5
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Netherlands 78.6
France 79.4
Italy 79.9
Sweden 80.2
Switzerland 80.4
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Japan 81.8
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birth, 2003
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2005 
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4. Causes: Why did the European welfare states become what they are? 
In the sequel of this paper, we move a few steps towards explaining the magnitude of social 
expenditures towards the elderly. This is of course an undertaking far beyond the scope of a 
single paper. We begin with demographic and political economy reasons, and then collect 
some evidence for incentive effects that create an expanded demand for social expenditures 
towards the elderly, particularly early retirement and disability pensions. 
4a. Demography 
One obvious explanation for the differences in the size of the welfare state and its generosity 
towards the elderly is, almost a banality, their number. While all European countries are age-
ing, more so than the United States, and all EU15 countries except Ireland have a higher share 
of older individuals than the US, Europe is far from homogenous in its current population age 
structure as Figure 21 shows. 
Figure 21: Age structure of European countries 
 
Source: Eurostat 2003 
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Italy has by far the largest share of elderly in the population, explaining part of the huge ratio 
between spending for the elderly and spending for the young visible in Figure 10. 
To proceed somewhat more formally, Figure 22 shows time-series cross-section regressions 
on the expenditure data depicted in Figure 12. The first four regressions are simple pooled 
OLS regressions. The last two regressions are fixed effects regressions, the first using only the 
cross-national variation, the second only the time-series variation. Indeed, the share of indi-
viduals age 65 and older is the key explanatory variable for the spending share on the elderly 
relative to GDP in almost all regression variants, the only exception being the last regression, 
indicating that the time-series variation of the elderly share is still very small: the aging 
process during the 1990-2003 time period is still very modest. As a side product, these regres-
sions also reiterate the positive coefficient of spending for the young, rejecting the crowding-
out hypothesis. 
 
Figure 22: Pooled time-series cross-section regressions of social expenditures for the elder-
ly as percent of GDP 
oldgdp Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
younggdp 0.252 2.6 0.197 2.0 0.263 3.6 0.129 1.9 0.057 0.8 0.733 9.8
gdpcap 0.164 3.47 0.066 1.82 0.337 7.05 0.387 7.8 0.054 2.6
share65p 1.197 12.3 1.436 15.8 1.438 15.8 0.310 4.1
year -0.416 -7.6
const 12.087 23.5 9.242 9.6 -7.410 -4.8 816.0 7.6 -16.181 -9.4 4.062 4.3
Adj R-squared 0.027 0.080 0.482 0.609 Within 0.626 0.485
Between 0.351 0.150
Overall 0.404 0.160  
Source: Author’s regressions based on the data depicted in Figure 12. 
 
4b. Political preferences 
A second potential cause for the spending patterns observed in Section 2 are differences in 
political preferences. In some countries, a majority of voters may be in favor of more spend-
ing to the elderly, in others more to the young. This is of course most likely connected to the 
age structure to of the populace, but there might be additional differences across countries. 
Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2003, 2004) have conducted a series of small sur-
veys in a few European countries to shed light on the political preferences of European citi-
zens. Their aim was to understand resistance to structural reforms, in particular to pension 
reforms. A first set of surveys was conducted in the Spring of 2000 for four countries. The 
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survey was repeated 1.5 years later in Germany and Italy, and once more for Germany in the 
Spring of 2003. Figure 23 summarizes results relevant for this paper; the exact wording of the 
questions is quoted on top of the figure. 
Figure 23: Preferences about size and redistribution of welfare state  
(i) Size of welfare state:“Should the state (+) increase pensions and/or transfers , thereby raising taxes and 
compulsory contributions to households, (0) maintain taxes and compulsory contributions at current levels, or 
(-) reduce pensions and/or transfers to households, thereby cutting taxes and/or compulsory contributions?” 
(ii) Intergenerational redistribution: “Should the state (+) allocate more resources to pensions and less to 
unemployed or young job seekers, (0) keep the current situation (-), or allocate less resources to pensions and 
more to unemployed and young job seekers?” 
 (i) Larger size of welfare state? (ii) More generous to elderly? 
 (+) (0) (-) (+) (0) (-) 
Germany (Spring 2000) 13% 54% 25% 17% 62% 22% 
Germany (Fall 2001) 12% 48% 34% 27% 51% 23% 
Germany (Spring 2003) 19% 36% 34% 19% 45% 29% 
Italy (Spring 2000) 17% 40% 43% 19% 35% 46% 
Italy (Fall 2001) 23% 47% 30% 34% 28% 38% 
France (Spring 2000) 14% 51% 35% 14% 66% 20% 
Spain (Spring 2000) 31% 53% 16% 10% 60% 30% 
Source: Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2003), Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2004) 
The results show an astounding variation across the four countries. First, the status quo bias is 
strong in all countries, but weakest in Italy. Second, further expansion of the welfare state 
does not find majority, but neither its retrenchment. Relatively speaking, the Spanish lean 
most towards an expansion of the welfare state. Third, except for Germany in 2001 (just after 
an incisive pension reform), there are more citizens who want to shift the welfare states’ gene-
rosity from old towards the young than in the reverse order. This is most pronounced in Italy, 
where this share even surpasses the status quo percentage. Note that this is in stark contrast to 
the fact that Italy has the oldest populace. 
The results in Figure 23 align with the actual spending shares (Figure 4) and the distribution 
between old and young (Figure 10) in a reverse pattern. Spain has the smallest welfare state 
and wishes to expand most. Italy has the most skewed distribution towards the elderly and 
wishes to change this most starkly. This may be interpreted as a desire for converge within 
Europe, or simply as a tendency to give up easiest those transfers that are supplied most gene-
rously, since this is likely to hurt least. Evidence for this interpretation comes from another set 
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of results derived from the 2001 survey by Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2003). Figure 
24 shows how different Germans and Italians judge the attraction of six pension reform pro-
posals. Italians would vote in majority for an increase in the retirement age (currently having 
one of the lowest average exit ages in Europe), while Germans rather reduce their pension 
benefits (currently having on of the highest pension benefits, measured in absolute Euro terms 
at purchasing power). 
Figure 24: Preferences about pension reform options 
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Source: Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2003), Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2004) 
 
4c. Early Retirement incentives 
A third reason for the large differences in the size of the welfare state and the generosity to-
wards the elderly are incentive effects in the public transfer systems, especially towards early 
retirement. Early retirement is widespread in Europe, as the low labor force participation rates 
among individuals aged 55-64 have indicated in Figure 17. Most striking are the cross-
national differences in economic activity vis-à-vis retirement if differential health (measured 
as a set of functional measures, so-called activities of daily living) is taken account of, see 
Figure 25. 
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Figure 25: Employment and retirement rates conditional on good health 
 
Source: Brugiavini, Croda, and Mariuzzo (2005), based on SHARE 2004. 
 
The cross-national differences are most evident between Sweden and France, for example, or 
between the Alpine neighbours Austria and Switzerland. To a large extent, these differences 
can be explained by incentive effects, as the International Social Security Project led by Gru-
ber and Wise has shown. The incentive effects of early old-age pensions measured in this pro-
ject align very well with the actual early retirement behavior, see Figure 26. 
Figure 26: Incentive effects and retirement behavior 
 
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999) 
 
Early retirement financed by old-age pensions is only part of the incentive story in Europe. In 
addition, disability pensions are often a substitute for stricter old-age pensions, often paid 
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without a medical test. Figure 27 shows the large cross-national variation in disability insur-
ance prevalence, both with and without a correction for health. As it turns out, differential 
health cannot explain the cross-national differences. If they are regressed on variables that 
measure the generosity of disability pensions, together with the ease of obtaining such a pen-
sion, almost 75 percent of the cross-national variation can be explained: 22 percent by the 
extent of coverage, 14 and 11 percent by the minimum and maximum benefit level, 12 per-
cent by the benefit level at full disability, and 15 percent by the stringency of a medical exam 
(Börsch-Supan, 2006). 
Combining the results of Figures 26 and 27 helps to explain the large social expenditures to 
the elderly in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands: While the public pension sector is rela-
tively small in the Netherlands, early retirement is very frequent, and disability uptake as 
well. Sweden has very generous pensions (this is, for the current elderly under the old pay-as-
you-go system) and a generous disability insurance. Denmark spends a lot on a base pension 
that is generous to the poor and the middle-class, plus a lot on a lenient disability insurance. 
Figure 27: Disability insurance prevalence, by correction for health status 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan (2005), based on SHARE 2004. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
Aim of this paper was to examine the generosity of the European welfare states towards the 
elderly. We have used a mixture of aggregate data from EUROSTAT and the OECD and sur-
vey data in particular from the new Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). 
As a first insight from this analysis, we observe that the size of the welfare state varies a great 
deal in Europe, as well as its relative generosity to the elderly and the young. There is no such 
thing as “the European welfare state model”, and even the three or four archetypical welfare 
state models à la Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999, 2003) mask some highly relevant differences 
within this typology. 
Second, while the size of the welfare states has changed over time – some retrenchment in the 
early 1990s when measured as share of GDP, but a fairly linear increase in absolute per capita 
expenditures – the spending patterns and the relative generosity between old and young has 
remained remarkably stable between 1990 and 2003. There is very little indication of a con-
vergence in spite of the accelerated European integration through the Maastricht process and 
the introduction of a single currency. 
Third, we did not find any convincing evidence for the hypothesis that spending for the eld-
erly crowds out spending for the young. Rather, spending for both age groups has expanded 
and contracted during the 1990-2003 period with the general size of the welfare state. This 
does not imply, however, that crowding out might occur at higher spending levels on the eld-
erly in the future when dependency ratios are substantially higher than in the 1990-2003 pe-
riod. 
Fourth, while a causal analysis explaining the size of the various European welfare state mod-
els is of course an undertaking far beyond the scope of this single paper, we have identified 
three dimensions that explain a great deal of the time-series and cross-national variation in 
welfare state generosity – both in general and as it relates to the elderly: the demographic 
forces of population aging which differ widely across European countries; political prefer-
ences pushing politicians in directions different across Europe; and incentive effects that cre-
ate an expanded demand for social expenditures towards the elderly (in particularly early re-
tirement and disability benefits) that are more pronounced in some European countries than in 
others. 
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These incentive effects are the key mechanisms by which government spending is crowding 
out economic activity. In the light of the accelerating demographic change during the coming 
decades, they need to be taken seriously because the trade-off between welfare state generos-
ity and economic activity, by which this paper started, is getting harsher as aging progresses. 
Policies which maintain spending levels but minimize incentive effects are particularly attrac-
tive. Examples are flexible retirement rules with actuarial benefit rules that strengthen labor 
supply, and public defined benefit plans indexed to demography that strengthen private old-
age provision. 
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